Economic development and poverty reduction in Korea by Kwon, Huck-ju & Yi, Ilcheong
Economic Development and Poverty Reduction in Korea: 
Governing Multifunctional Institutions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Huck-ju Kwon 
Seoul National University, Republic of Korea 
 
Ilcheong Yi 
Kyushu University, Japan 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This paper is to be presented at the RC 19 annual conference on ‘The Future of Social 
Citizenship: Politics, Citizenship and Outcome’, co-organized by the Institute for Future Studies 
and Swedish Institute for Social Research, Stockholm University, 4-6 September 2008.  
 
 
 
 
 
This study is a much revised version of the working paper on ‘Development Strategies, Welfare 
Regimes and Poverty Reduction in Korea’ of the United Nations Research Institute for Social 
Development. Thanks are owed to Yusuf Bangura for providing useful comments on an earlier 
version. The usual caveats apply. 
 
 1
Abstract 
 
Combining economic development and poverty reduction is a challenge for 
developing countries. To find mechanisms for integrating both goals, the 
authors examine the Republic of Korea’s development strategy that 
transformed one of Asia’s poorest nations into an industrialized one, with low 
levels of poverty. The paper investigates the state-society nexus in which 
Korea’s developmental state has operated and looks at governance for 
economic development, focusing especially on multifunctioning institutions 
performing for economic growth and poverty reduction. It also provides 
strategic suggestions for developing countries on managing effectively within 
institutional constraints and moving beyond a simple emphasis on good 
governance. 
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Introduction 
 
To fight poverty, it is necessary for developing countries—where a majority of the poor 
live—to strive for economic development. What makes this task harder is that economic 
development does not necessarily reduce poverty or income inequality. The challenge 
here is to combine poverty reduction and economic growth. To tackle this, the authors 
examine the Republic of Korea’s development strategy that transformed one of Asia’s 
poorest nations in the 1950s into an industrialized one, with low poverty and high 
human resource reserves. 
 
The paper examines, first, the state-society nexus at the macro-level in which Korea’s 
developmental state has operated. This sets the context for subsequent analyses of the 
institutional dynamics of the Korean state. Second, the authors study the role of 
government as an agency of development. Instead of emphasising the government’s 
strategic role in economic development, the paper analyses its institutional dynamics, 
especially the mobilisation of multifunctioning institutions, which enabled Korea to 
combine economic development and poverty reduction during its period of rapid growth.  
 
This research stems partly from dissatisfaction with the prevalent discourse on the 
relationship between economic development, poverty reduction and the function of the 
state. Leading international agencies, such as the World Bank and the United Nations 
Development Programme, have stressed the importance of good governance for 
economic development, with the crux of their argument being that good governance is 
conducive to economic growth. In many developing countries, the effective institutions 
needed for good governance are often among the key components that are missing 
(Gough and Wood, 2004). Nevertheless, there are several cases of developing countries 
that have experienced successful economic growth and poverty reduction before even 
acquiring the necessary components of good governance. In these cases, the state often 
plays a pivotal part in organising the main elements of economic growth and poverty 
reduction. As Gerschenkron (1962: 358) makes clear, what matters in economic 
development is not the possession of certain prerequisites for this goal, but the strategy 
(or capacity) to mobilize (or improvise) key institutional devices to meet the challenges 
during this process.  
 
A large body of literature on the developmental state highlights the state’s role in East 
Asia’s development (Johnson, 1999; Woo-Cumings, 1999; Kohli, 2004;), revealing that 
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government plays a strategic part in economic development, helped by a bureaucracy 
that has sufficient scope to take initiatives and operate effectively. It is a useful rebuttal 
to the argument that state intervention in economic development results inevitably in 
failure (Kruger, 1974). Studies of developmental states have, nevertheless, been implicit, 
if not silent, about poverty reduction. These studies conceal the way in which the 
Korean developmental state managed to combine economic development and poverty 
reduction. What were the underlying dynamics that enabled Korea’s development 
experience to incorporate both?  
 
The authors are also partly dissatisfied with the studies on social policy in East Asia in 
general, and Korea in particular (Ku, 1997; Goodman et al., 1998; Kwon, 1999; 
Holliday, 2000;). The studies maintain that social policy in East Asia—including 
Korea—had been used as an effective tool for economic development. The people 
initially protected by social policy programmes were civil servants and workers 
employed in strategic industries so that they could be mobilized for economic 
development (Yi, 2007). Because of these characteristics, social policies tended to have 
little impact on poverty reduction and income inequality (Kwon, 2001). Given that 
economic growth does not necessarily lead to poverty reduction, and that this 
orientation of social policy in Korea would not have reduced the widespread poverty, it 
warrants careful investigation into how Korea managed to reduce poverty during its 
phase of rapid economic growth. It remains an elusive task for many fast-growing 
economies today, such as China and Vietnam, to merge economic growth and poverty 
reduction. Nevertheless, existing studies on social policy fail to provide convincing 
explanations. 
 
In developing countries, economic and social institutions are often not well-established 
or functionally differentiated and operate with limited institutional resources (Grindle, 
2004). It is necessary to make strategic choices when new institutions are established 
according to policy priority. As the literature shows (Wade, 1990; Woo, 1991), Korea’s 
government was a typical example of the developmental state. How did the state 
perform its task within such institutional constraints? This paper argues that the Korean 
government succeeded in achieving economic growth and poverty reduction by creating 
a mechanism linking both social and economic policies. It mobilized institutions whose 
main tasks were not social protection or poverty reduction and made these institutions 
multifunctional in order to achieve both first- and second-order goals.  
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To study these institutional dynamics, it is essential, first, to examine the state-society 
nexus and look, in particular, at the historical context in which Korea’s developmental 
state was autonomous enough to pursue its aim of economic development. The nation’s 
elite might decide to adopt a developmental state strategy, but social forces, such as the 
land-owning class, businesses or trade unions, could—in order to protect their own 
economic interests—frustrate their efforts (Evans, 1995). In some developing countries, 
social forces which acquired their power base under colonial rule could take on the state 
while, in others, the state could be the only actor shaping overall public policy direction.  
 
Second, the governance structure and environment, particularly the presence of a 
competent bureaucracy in which able bureaucrats can operate effectively, need to be 
considered. A state bureaucracy needs a measure of organisational strength, with full-
time, professional, salaried civil servants and a clear hierarchical structure (Weber, 
1968). While most developing countries are unlikely to have an ideal-typical model of 
Weberian bureaucracy, the launching of an ambitious economic development project 
demands at least a decent corps of bureaucrats. It is not unusual in developing countries 
to find individuals lacking necessary competence who hold government jobs by virtue 
of their political connection. A few bureaucrats also moonlight because of their 
inadequate salaries. In such circumstances, it is difficult to expect a bureaucracy to 
effectively implement developmental policy. 
 
Third, this paper explores how the government coordinates public institutions to 
perform multiple—and sometimes contradictory—functions to achieve its goals of 
economic development and poverty reduction. The government can play a crucial part 
in setting out a road map for medium- and long-term economic development and 
providing economic actors with an environment facilitating their involvement in 
national development. It, therefore, needs to maintain a certain level of cohesion among 
different economic agencies (Kohli, 2004). There is, on occasion, opposition from 
institutions to specific public policies that may contradict, or go beyond, their economic 
and political objectives. It depends on the government’s ability to persuade these 
institutions to fulfil tasks that may fall outside their purview, but are essential for the 
overall framework of economic development. The ability of the state to coordinate and 
mobilize institutions for policy objectives is vital to maintaining the coherence of a 
policy regime, connecting production and welfare systems within it. In subsequent 
sections, the authors attempt to answer questions raised earlier in regard to these three 
aspects of the developmental state.  
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The paper’s scope and time-span covers the period largely from 1945 until the early 
1980s, when Korea made rapid economic progress. While the paper does not describe 
this in historical sequence, it focuses on discrete—and relevant—points in time. During 
this phase, Korea embarked on an industrialisation programme with remarkable success. 
The paper pays special attention to the government under President Park Chung-hee. 
 
Overview of the Trajectory of Development Strategies 
 
This section provides a brief overview, until the present, of the historical trajectory of 
development strategies and lays out a policy context for discussion in the sections that 
follow. Korea’s post-liberation governments found it difficult to implement meaningful 
economic policies because of the industrial vacuum left by Japan in 1945 and the 
destruction caused by the Korean War. The principal aim of Korea’s economic policy 
was import substitution industrialisation, but its outcome was unimpressive. Despite this, 
the Syngman Rhee government (1948-1960) laid the crucial foundation for economic 
development in the 1960s—that of land reform. The nature and outcome of land reform 
in this period is discussed in the next section.  
 
After the short-lived Chang Myon government (1960-1961), the government of Park 
Chung-hee (1961-1979) launched a state-led policy of economic development. The Park 
government shifted economic policy from import substitution industrialisation to 
export-led development in the mid-1960s, during which the economy recorded 
impressive growth, simultaneously with a reduction in poverty. From the early 1970s, 
President Park initiated an economic policy aimed at establishing heavy and chemical 
industries, while his grip on power—strengthened by constitutional reform—grew 
increasingly undemocratic.  
 
The Park government’s new focus on capital-intensive heavy and chemical industries 
coincided with a supply of labour from rural areas—reaching its limit in the early 
1970s—and the beginning of the United States (US) military withdrawal from Korea. 
The government provided a range of special favours to the chaebol,1 or large business 
conglomerates. Social policy programmes, such as health insurance and public pensions, 
were either contemplated or introduced in the context of heavy and chemical industries. 
                                                          
1 A chaebol is a large capitalist conglomerate, usually controlled by a single family with 
interests in a variety of companies, similar to the Japanese Zaibatsu. 
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This strategy faced tough challenges. Large amounts of capital spending, together with a 
sudden rise in oil prices, led to high inflation and a deterioration in income distribution, 
while social demand for democratisation increased.  
 
After the sudden downfall of President Park in 1979, another military general took over 
amid the political turmoil. The government of Chun Doo-hwan (1980-1988) 
implemented stabilisation policies, enforced structural adjustment in heavy and 
chemical industries—expanded by the previous government—and attempted to control 
public spending. President Chun later conceded constitutional reform to the 
democratisation movement, but was able to see political power shift to his chosen 
successor after the 1987 election. Trade unions were allowed to organize more freely 
and to strike; public health insurance was extended to a wider section of the population; 
and a National Pension Scheme was introduced.  
 
The Kim Young-sam government (1993-1998) tried to transform the Korean economy 
into a technologically oriented one to compete in a globalising world and enacted a 
variety of economic liberalisation measures to open Korea to the world market. But the 
government’s attempt to carry through labour market reform—considered a prerequisite 
for economic transformation—ended in failure in February 1997. At the end of 1997, 
Korea’s economy was hit severely by the Asian financial crisis, which started with the 
fall of Thailand’s currency, the Baht. The government of Kim Dae-jung (1998-2003) 
implemented labour market reform, following an International Monetary Fund 
conditionality, while strengthening the welfare state under the banner of ‘productive 
welfare’. This led to a policy regime that mixed the liberal orientation of labour market 
policy with the inclusive trend of social policy. From 2003 to 2008, the government of 
Roh Moo-hyun maintained continuity in its policy orientation, but placed greater 
emphasis on a redistributive social policy. 
 
Society and the Developmental State Nexus: Land Reform 
 
Land reform has been a controversial issue in the development debate. Some argue that 
it is a prerequisite for successful economic development; others, that it inevitably brings 
political turmoil which disrupts economic growth. A body of literature in development 
studies has pointed out that successful land reform in the late 1940s in Korea—as well 
as in Japan and Taiwan—is strongly related to economic development and poverty 
reduction (for example, World Bank, 2006). The access to even a small amount of land 
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provides an important safety net, a source of self-employment and an alternative 
insurance to the economic contingencies of life (Dasgupta and Ray, 1987; Deininger 
and Binswanger, 1999). Landownership also affects economic growth through 
investment in soils and the establishment of perennials. Owners are likelier to try and 
improve the soil than tenants and, consequently, contribute to the asset accumulation of 
landowners. 
 
Despite the positive relationship between equitable landownership and agricultural 
productivity, there appears to be no direct positive connection in Korea’s case between 
land reform and economic development. Economic development in Korea was not 
based mainly on the growth of an agricultural sector (Adelman, 1997), and some 
scholars see land reform as a failure, since it did not create an agricultural sector 
consisting of middle class farmers (Hwang, 1985).  
 
The importance of land reform in Korea’s economic development is due not so much to 
the development of an agricultural sector as the structural changes in state-society 
relations that it effected. Land reform occurred in three waves, from 1946 to 1955, 
creating small, independent farmers who were former tenants of Korean and Japanese 
landlords under Japanese rule (1910-1945). After the Second World War, the US 
military government (1945-1948) took a first step, in 1946, towards land reform. It 
limited peasants’ land rent to one-third of the value of the land’s annual output, which 
was a drastic reduction. In 1948, the US military government sold land that belonged to 
Japan’s Oriental Development Company (later, the New Korea Public Company) to 
tenants at a price equivalent in value to the land’s average production for three years. 
Influenced by socialist land reform in North Korea, the sovereign Korean government—
established in 1948—promulgated laws on land reform in 1949 and implemented them 
from 1949 to 1955. They included three basic principles emphasising equality rather 
than growth: first, farmland could be owned only by those who actually farmed the 
land; second, land was to be limited to three chungbo (or three hectares); and third, 
farmers could not contract out their land to others for farming (Sin, 1988). Based on 
these principles, the government bought land from those who owned more than the limit, 
or did not farm it themselves, and sold it to others who had been farming it, at a price 
equivalent to one and a half times the land’s average annual production.2
                                                          
2 Three major explanations exist for the political rationale of land reform. First, it was the 
peasants who suffered most under Japanese rule, with landlords seen as collaborators—a 
historical imperative of the time. Second, President Rhee sought to undermine the economic 
basis of the conservative political elite, many of whom were landlords. Third, land reform was 
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While some landowners sold their land before land reform was implemented, over 60 
per cent of the land was bought by government. Landowners received government 
bonds, while tenant farmers paid a price equivalent to one and a half times its average 
annual production, payable over three years (Kim, 1997: 307). After land reform, the 
land available for tenant farming in 1951 was only 8.1 per cent, while in 1945 it had 
been 65 per cent. Land reform in Korea was successful in that it created self-owning 
farmers and sharply reduced inequalities in landownership. For example, in Yongmun 
village in Chungnam province, the Gini index of landownership dropped from 0.63 of 
1943 to 0.49 of 1965 (Cho, 2003: 297), while farm productivity climbed. Families in 
rural areas, with their own land and higher productivity, could now send their children 
to school instead of the paddy field (Cho, 2003). It was government policy that made 
education the biggest item in the budget, next to defence. This resulted in an 
‘astonishing record’ in comparison with other developing countries and reinforced the 
effect of land reform on education. From 1945 to 1959, the number of students in liberal 
arts secondary schools with both rural and urban backgrounds increased to 370 per cent; 
in vocational high schools to 299 per cent; and in higher education to 1,292 per cent. By 
the late 1950s, literacy among the entire population was almost 90 per cent (USAID, 
1959; Cho and Oh, 2003: 283). In brief, land reform not only redistributed land to 
significantly reduce inequalities in landownership, but also served as a powerful social 
policy, lessening poverty and increasing the educational level of the rural population. As 
Cho (2003) argues, a rural population with higher levels of education constituted a huge 
reservoir of well-educated labour that would play a salient role in the industrialisation of 
the 1960s. 
 
Land reform also led to the demise of the landowning class as a dominant social force. 
While land reform was an opportunity for landowners to transform themselves into a 
new capitalist class—they were paid well for their land—many failed to do so, partly 
because of their lack of entrepreneurship resulting from Japanese colonial policy which 
barred Korean businessmen from light and heavy industries. Landlords who sold their 
land to the government also suffered from hyperinflation during the Korean War which, 
in turn, significantly reduced the value of government bonds. The Rhee government, too, 
was unable to create a favourable economic environment for former landlords to 
                                                                                                                                                                          
the United States’ counter-revolution against the communist threat of a socialist revolution. The 
US had recommended land reform to both the Korean and Taiwanese governments (Kim, 1975). 
 9
transform themselves into entrepreneurs.3 The end of the landowning class created a 
vacuum in the class structure and allowed considerable autonomy to the developmental 
state to push through with industrialisation.  
 
An Effective Bureaucratic System and Economic Development 
 
To launch a developmental state strategy, it is essential to have an effective bureaucratic 
system. The military coup d’état by Park Chung-hee was the beginning of the state-led 
drive for economic development in 1961. Before Park’s government, the First and 
Second Republics were unable to implement any explicit economic development 
strategies because of the Korean War and political wrangling among the country’s elites. 
Nevertheless, the government of the First Republic under President Rhee carried out 
successful land reforms in a brief span of time, laying the groundwork for the 
developmental state to implement its economic programme and demonstrating the 
effectiveness of the Rhee government in a particular field. Kohli argues that the Korean 
bureaucracy had inherited both its system and personnel from Japan’s colonial 
government, which was similar to a developmental state (Kohli, 2004). While the 
Japanese colonial government brought a modern bureaucratic machinery to better 
exploit Korea, the bureaucratic penetration of society by a central authority had been in 
place in Korea for several hundred years before Japanese rule. A merit-based 
bureaucratic system had existed in the country for over 600 years. The principle of 
merit-based recruitment continued after the establishment of the republic: the strength 
of the bureaucracy was its openness to all social classes. If successful in the 
examinations, young talent was recruited from the entire population and not from a 
particular social class that had political influence. Given that the education system was 
open to most young people, those from poorer backgrounds could—if they worked 
hard—compete academically with those who were better off. According to Yoo’s survey 
in 1966, 47.5 per cent of higher ranking officials came from small farming families 
while 15.5 per cent had fathers who were in the public sector (Yoo, 1966).  
                                                          
3 Another factor was business clientelism, formed from the beginning of the Korean Republic. 
Those who accumulated wealth and established big companies in the 1950s collaborated with 
political authorities by providing the ruling party with kickbacks in return for favourable 
treatment. The expansion and survival of Korean business relied entirely on the government, 
which had the power to distribute enemy (Japanese) property and allocate foreign aid to 
business (Woo, 1991: 66; Nam, 1995: 360). The symbiotic relationship between government 
and big enterprises narrowed the space for newcomers to business. Most chaebol in the 1970s 
had accumulated wealth in the 1950s, based not on land but on favourable treatment by the 
government (Cho, 1997).  
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During the first 12 years of Korean independence, the country’s top policy makers failed 
to set clear policy goals that the bureaucracy could pursue. Without clear goals and 
purposeful activity, the bureaucracy could engender rent-seeking behaviour. The United 
States Agency for International Development (USAID) pointed out that, in the late 
1950s, ‘a group of responsible young officers with professional training and skill’ grew 
in number in the various government ministries and agencies and found ‘pride and 
satisfaction in their capacities to present objective views to their politically appointed 
ministers with increasing success’ (USAID, 1959: 12). This observation suggests that a 
small but growing number of bureaucrats became the spearhead of industrialisation in 
the 1960s and 1970s when well-defined development goals were set and pursued.  
 
The Park government, which came to power in a military coup in 1961, defined 
economic development and poverty eradication as the top priority of its ‘revolution’, 
and took advantage of the bureaucratic system. It brought a sense of purpose, discipline 
and rationalism to the bureaucracy and created an Economic Planning Board as a ‘pilot 
agency’ to lead economic policy. From the start of President Park’s government, a few 
key ministries—linked to macroeconomic management and financial institutions, such 
as banks—were headed mostly by civilian experts rather than military personnel, while 
the remainder were led by ex-military generals. It was a typical developmental state, 
setting up economic growth as a fundamental goal, developing a coherent strategy and 
rallying resources to achieve it. In 1961, the government reinforced the Civil Service 
Pension Scheme to mobilize civil servants for its economic development plan (Kwon, 
2006).  
 
What made the Park government effective as a developmental state was its discipline 
over the private sector. At the start of import substitution industrialisation in the early 
1960s, private enterprises needed a guarantee, underwritten by government, to secure 
foreign loans. Through this, and other regulatory mechanisms, the government was able 
to intervene in market decisions without actually producing goods through state-owned 
enterprises. The government imposed performance standards on private firms and, once 
these standards were met, provided various types of subsidies—such as low-interest 
capital and licenses—to enter a new market. It was, thus, able to pick winners in the 
market that, subsequently, would become big business. 
 
It was also powerfully related to the structure of the financial market. The Korean 
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financial system was credit-based in the 1960s and 1970s where private firms, 
especially the chaebol, had a high debt-equity ratio that forced them to depend heavily 
on banks—which were either owned or controlled by the government—rather than on 
the stock market. Through this credit-based system and big business dependence on 
banks, the government and, in particular, the Economic Planning Board as a central 
guidance agency, implemented economic development policy. 
 
Poverty Reduction and Multifunctional Institutions 
 
Poverty reduction and industrialisation 
 
The welfare state in Korea has, arguably, been instrumental in economic development 
(Goodman et al., 1998; Holliday, 2000; Kwon, 2005). The economic ministry, with a 
strong say in most government policies, carefully selected and modified welfare 
programmes for economic development. For example, the Industrial Accident Insurance 
Scheme was introduced in 1964 as the first compulsory welfare programme in Korea. 
Starting with large-scale enterprises of over 500 workers, it expanded gradually to 
include smaller workplaces. It was chosen as Korea’s first welfare scheme because the 
government saw it as an indispensable welfare programme following the launch of its 
ambitious industrialisation plan (Ministry of Labour, 1981). It was also easier to 
implement than other alternative programmes as—under the 1953 Labour Standard 
Act—employers were becoming liable for industrial accidents at work, regardless of 
their cause. The government, therefore, chose a scheme that needed no additional cost. 
The medical insurance programme which, in due course, became the National Health 
Insurance, was introduced in 1977. It had similar financial arrangements where 
employers and employees contributed to insurance funds, which then paid out to 
hospitals and clinics for members’ health care. Government subvention was limited to 
supporting administrative costs for an initial period—a role referred to by Kwon (1997) 
as that of a ‘regulator’ in financing social policy. In its effort to industrialize, the 
developmental state exploited the instrumental role of social policy by being a regulator, 
with the clear aim of economic growth. 
 
Salaried workers with stable jobs were the main beneficiaries of the welfare state, while 
farmers, the unemployed and urban informal sector workers were excluded until the late 
1980s. The family—another component of the welfare regime—was the main provider 
of social safety. Confucian ethics, which formed the rationale behind this emphasis on 
 12
the family, remained strong and were actively re-cultivated during this phase of rapid 
industrialisation. Nevertheless, considering that the poor tended to have poor family 
members, its impact on poverty reduction was limited.4
 
Korea’s most explicit poverty reduction measure, the public assistance programme, was 
designed within the context of this division of welfare between the public sector and the 
family. The public assistance programme—introduced in 1961, and reformed in 1965 
and 2001—was based on a strict, means-tested and family-support principle. The 
poverty line was defined in terms of an absolute concept and the poor, who had family 
members to rely on, were not eligible for the benefits. The government made this 
division in the welfare structure effective through regulations and laws to support the 
family. Inheritance taxes of children living with elderly parents were reduced; 
companies were advised to be partial to applicants with elderly parents; and those caring 
for elderly parents were exempt from military service (Yi, 2005: 51). 
 
Table 1. Number of people covered by public assistance programme, 1965-1990 (thousands) 
 Benefit categories 
 First Second Third 
Percentage of  
total population 
1965 288 72 3563 13.66 
1970 306 63 2116  7.71 
1975 375 52 904  3.77 
1980 339 47 1500  4.96 
1985 282 63 1928  5.52 
1990 340 81 1835  5.26 
Source: National Statistical Office, 1966, 1990; Suh, 1981. 
 
According to table 1, only a small fraction of those officially identified as poor received 
income support (first and second categories). The rise in the number of people 
benefiting from public assistance in 1980 was not due to an increase in poverty but to 
the official poverty line being set higher than before. Those between 18 and 64 years of 
age were now eligible for income support for training, food and family allowances if 
they pursued job training programmes. 
                                                          
4 Kwon, based on the 1996 national income survey, shows that private transfers—which were 
larger than public transfers—from family members to the elderly were only less than half of the 
relative poverty line (Kwon, 2001). For instance, among single elderly households, 72 per cent 
of the income of those in the poorest decile came from private transfers, but formed only 40 per 
cent of the relative poverty line (Kwon, 2001: 91). 
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Despite the stringent public assistance programme, poverty incidence was rapidly 
reduced. As table 2 shows, it was lowered from 40.9 per cent of all households in 1965 
to 23.4 per cent in 1970, 9.8 per cent in 1980 and 7.6 per cent in 1991. Although these 
figures were produced by the government, based on an absolute concept, the reduction 
in poverty was remarkable. 
 
Table 2. Incidence of absolute poverty (percentage) 
 1965 1970 1976 1980 1991 
Urban households 54.9 16.2 18.1 10.4 8.7 
Rural households 35.8 27.9 11.7 9.0 2.8 
All households 40.9 23.4 14.8 9.8 7.6 
Note: The absolute poverty line was 121,000 won per month (at 1981 prices) for a five-person 
household. Source: Kwon, 1998: 34. 
 
How did this effective poverty reduction take place, despite a limited public assistance 
programme? Kwon contends that Korea’s success in reducing poverty was due not to 
the explicit poverty reduction policies but to the indirect effects of high economic 
growth (Kwon, 1998). While agreeing with this observation, the authors insist that it 
was not the result of a trickle-down effect but the consequence of two main factors: first, 
the social structure that allowed the widest section of the population to participate in 
mainstream social change to industrialisation; and second, the developmental state’s 
ability to mobilize and coordinate institutions to reduce poverty.  
 
From 1962 to 1967, when the developmental state strategy based on import substitution 
industrialisation was fully operational, economic growth was impressive and its impact 
on employment immense. During this time, the gross national product (GNP) increased 
rapidly and unemployment fell sharply, as table 3 shows. Import substitution 
industrialization absorbed labour effectively: employment rose by 10 per cent, despite a 
corresponding 12 per cent rise in the economically active population (Adelman, 1997: 
514). From 1967 to 1971, when Korea shifted its strategy from import substitution to 
export-oriented industrialisation, labour-intensive industries and the growing service 
sector continued to absorb labour, which led to higher incomes for the working 
population (see table 4). In particular, poverty in urban areas decreased.  
 
Table 3. Major economic indicators in Korea 
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 1961 1966 1972 1981 1987 1993 
GNP per capita 
(dollars) 
90 125 306 1,741 3,218 7,513 
Growth rate 1.6 6.8 16.1 21.3 10.7 15.2 
Unemployment rate a 17 b
(7) 
15 
(6) 
10 
(4) 
10 
(4) 
5 
(3) 
4 
(3) 
a Includes both the unemployed and those working less than 18 hours per week. Figures in 
parentheses indicate full-time unemployment. b 1963 figure. Source: Adelman, 1997: 535. 
 
Table 4. Employees by sector (percentage) 
 Agriculture & 
Forestry 
Manufacturing & 
Mining 
Service 
1966 57.89 10.48 31.27 
1971 48.44 14.19 37.37 
1978 38.41 23.15 38.44 
1985 24.94 24.44 50.62 
1990 18.25 27.32 54.42 
Source: National Statistical Office, 1966; 1986; 1990. 
 
Effective poverty reduction in the 1960s was mainly because of successful labour-
intensive industrialisation led by the developmental state. It is necessary to see this 
economic development from a structural point of view. The developmental state enjoyed 
policy autonomy without strong opposition from powerful social forces, especially 
landowners. The absence of this class is conspicuous when comparing Korea’s 
developmental experience with other countries, such as Brazil and the Philippines. As 
discussed earlier, land reform in the late 1940s laid the structural groundwork for the 
developmental state to work towards economic growth. More important, land reform 
created self-owning farmers, who then began to educate their children. These children 
participated in the rapid industrialisation process, and the country’s broad-based 
economic growth was the key to poverty reduction and relatively equal distribution of 
income. Land reform, therefore, was an effective social policy programme through 
which the developmental state could implement a limited, but explicit, poverty 
reduction policy in the 1960s. 
 
Multifunctional institutions and poverty reduction 
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The Korean government adopted specific policies to reduce poverty and mobilized 
economic institutions to perform poverty reduction functions, with measures to 
eliminate usurious loans in rural areas in 1961. Usury was a widespread economic 
activity, embedded in a production pattern where farmers lived on subsistence 
agriculture. Following bad harvests, farmers borrowed money from moneylenders or 
(occasionally) from other farmers who had relatively more money than themselves, to 
purchase fertilizer and life’s basic necessities—further compounding their financial 
predicament. Shortly after taking over in 1961, the military government enacted 
measures to ensure loans were registered and banned from then on. Farmers who 
recorded debts with high interest could transfer them to agricultural cooperatives—
nationwide farmers’ organisations—that offered a longer-term grace period and cheaper 
interest, while lenders received a bond from the cooperatives. This was, in fact, a partial 
cancellation of farmers’ debts and an extension of the debt service period on favourable 
terms (SCNR, 1963: 1104). Agricultural cooperatives began to play the role of formal 
rural credit institutions where loans were traded competitively and effectively. They 
could respond to the income shock of specific crop growers, or regions, with their 
diversified loan portfolios. They also had the effect of reducing the number of 
delinquent borrowers, since farmers had to consume more wisely than under the usury 
system with its lax borrowing procedures. These extraordinary measures were only 
possible under a military government that had recently taken power, pledging to reduce 
poverty. It provided a momentum for agricultural cooperatives to be the focal point for 
rural development and to function as agricultural financing institutions.  
 
Another case in point was the government’s rice purchasing system which lasted 
through the 1970s. The production of rice—the country’s main staple—had a 
tremendous effect on rural and urban living standards and the macro economy in 
general. Rice accounted for more than a third of the total income of rural households 
and over 40 per cent of all agricultural products in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s. The cost 
of rice was the principal factor affecting overall consumer prices and, subsequently, the 
government’s main concern in its efforts to control inflation (Kim and Kim, 1984: 25-
28). The government also established a rice purchasing scheme that endeavoured to 
control prices and subsidize farmers: within the Economic Planning Board, the 
Department of Consumer Prices managed a Special Account for the Purchase of Rice, 
established in 1961.  
 
From 1962 to 1967, the priority of the rice purchasing scheme was to control the price 
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of rice, which had seen large seasonal fluctuations, rather than provide support to 
farmers. The government’s selling price was normally higher than the purchasing price. 
It paid more attention to supporting farmers in 1968 when it pushed the purchasing 
price higher than production cost. From the early 1970s, when a new variety of rice with 
higher productivity was introduced to farmers by the government, the rice purchasing 
policy benefited both urban and rural households. The new variety was bought for more 
than its production cost and sold to urban households for less than the purchase price. 
The conventional variety, with its better quality, was freely traded and consumed by 
upper income groups. The dual price policy for the new variety of rice, and the free 
trading of the conventional variety, benefited both urban and—in particular—rural 
households. The income gap between urban and rural households began to diminish and, 
briefly in 1974 and 1975, rural household incomes surpassed those of urban ones (Kim 
and Kim, 1984: 40).  
 
These policies were combined with a nationwide campaign to mobilize human 
resources and change attitudes. Because of rapid industrialisation in the 1960s, rural 
household incomes fell behind those of their urban counterparts around 1967. From 
1971, the government initiated a rural development programme called Saemaul Undong 
(or New Village Movement). The programme’s basic framework was that the 
government would provide small start-up subventions for projects to develop local 
communities economically. For example, the government allocated material for 
constructing village roads, bridges, electrification infrastructure and storage sheds 
crucial for these communities’ economic development. Subsequently, the village people 
provided free labour for these projects. A study estimates that, for these projects, 
government subventions accounted for some 20-30 per cent of expenditure, while 
village people’s labour and other contributions constituted another 30-60 per cent, and 
private donations and bank loans the rest (Kim, 1991). The government spent 2.5 per 
cent of GNP average per year, which was an immense amount of social spending, given 
that there was a strict, means-tested public assistance programme in place. 
 
While the Saemaul Undong was clearly an effort to boost income levels in rural areas, it 
also had overtones of political mobilisation to maintain President Park’s political power, 
especially in rural areas where his political support was stronger than in urban ones. 
President Park changed the constitution to stay in power for life. In 1972, his 
government announced the Presidential Emergency Measure Number Three which 
temporarily waived income taxes for low-income households and strengthened 
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regulations on unfair practices by employers in the workplace (Kwon, 1999: 41). 
 
Mobilization of institutions for public health 
 
Public health deals with the health of the population as a whole and differs from 
medical health care that addresses individual ailments. Public health has centred more 
on preventative action than on treating illnesses and has focused more on community-
based activities than medical practice for individual patients (Winslow, 1920) The 
implementation of public health, therefore, requires an administrative system that differs 
from the provision of medical care for individuals. It needs human and material 
resources and administrative capacities for tackling the often nationwide public health 
issues. 
 
The developmental state under President Park established a system of public health and 
mobilized it for both public health and development. The public health sector for the 
control of communicable and chronic diseases showed substantial growth under the 
colonial regime and the US military government after 1945, but was weakened 
following administrative reforms from 1948 to 1960. After the 1961 coup, it became a 
policy priority to establish a comprehensive public health system. The government 
placed strong emphasis on its plan to reduce—from 1,033 to zero by 1963—all rural 
areas without public health facilities and improve health conditions to provide medical 
care for the poor (SCNR, 1963: 422).  
 
The role of these public health facilities was apparent, since they played a part in 
combining public health and primary medical care on the one hand and population 
control—used as a policy tool to reduce poverty—on the other. Like other developing 
countries, the population that exceeded the level of economic affordability was one of 
the major reasons for poverty in Korea. For a military government aiming to control 
population through family planning to reduce dependent family members, public health 
facilities, with their national networks and medical expertise, could serve as ideal 
institutions. Consequently, the military government actively established these facilities 
across the country and used them for both population control and prevention of 
communicable and chronic diseases.  
 
To maximize institutional synergy, Korean governments constructed new public health 
facilities from 1974 in 1,340 myon (villages), with financial support from agricultural 
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cooperatives. They also established a Health Assistance Programme in 1977 aimed at 
those benefiting from public assistance, and introduced a law in 1980 allowing medical 
graduates to serve in public health facilities in lieu of military service (Son, 1999). The 
latter provided a noticeable boost to villages in terms of medical service delivery, since 
it was the point where public health facilities were strengthened to provide almost free 
medical service to rural areas. With this series of policy attempts, health inequality—in 
terms of access to health care facilities—was greatly reduced. 
 
Human resource development 
 
After the devastation of the Korean War, it seemed that the only abundant resources 
Korea possessed were human ones. The government made an effort to re-establish 
elementary schools destroyed during the war. From 1950 to 1960, the number of 
elementary schools rose from 3,942 to 4,496. All school levels, in both public and 
private sectors, were enlarged, with the public sector expanding its elementary school 
level and the private sector its middle and upper school levels. The share of the budget 
for education grew rapidly from 4.2 per cent in 1954 to 9.4 per cent in 1955, reaching an 
average of over 17 per cent by the end of the 1970s. The series of government efforts in 
education paid off: by 1959, the enrolment rate in elementary schools had already 
reached 96.1 per cent (KEDI, 2005a: 34-35).  
 
Table 5. Enrollment and advancement rates in schools (percentage) 
Advancement / employment rate of high 
school graduates 
 Elementary 
school 
enrollment rate 
Advancement rate 
of elementary 
school graduates 
Advancement rate 
of middle school 
graduates Rate of 
advancement a
Rate of  
employment b
1959  96.1     
1965  97.7 54.3 69.1 32.3 37.5 
1975 105.0 77.2 74.7 25.8 39.9 
1985  99.9 99.2 90.7 36.4 42.1 
1990 101.7 99.8 95.7 33.2 51.0 
1995 100.1 99.9 98.5 51.4 69.3 
2000  98.7 99.9 99.5 68.0 66.1 
2003  99.5 99.9 99.7 79.7 66.3 
a Rate of advancement = (university entrants / number of graduates) x 100. 
b Rate of employment = (number of employed / number of graduates – university entrants + number of 
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army enlistments) x 100. Source: KEDI, 2005a; 2005b. 
 
To industrialize, Korea needed labour with appropriate skills. In the 1950s, there was a 
lack of specialized vocational schools to impart vocational training, although a few 
secondary schools existed where vocational education accounted for over 30 per cent of 
the total teaching hours. Educational reform by the Park government in 1963 was an 
attempt to reorganize the educational structure for developmental purposes. Instead of 
the previous governments’ rationale of a liberal arts education, President Park’s 
government emphasized the importance of a skills-oriented one.  
 
In vocational schools, education was put under an administrative system separate from 
liberal arts secondary schools. It emphasized practical skills and was meant to account 
for over 50 per cent of the total teaching hours (Kang et al., 1998: 30-34). Vocational 
high schools expanded dramatically between 1973 and 1979, when the government 
established a policy to promote these schools by increasing opportunities for a 
university education for graduates, waiving military service, issuing vocational licences 
and providing scholarships. The response was an increase in applicants to vocational 
schools (Kim, 1993). The government took the initiative on vocational training by 
enacting the Vocational Training Act in 1967. With loans from the Asian Development 
Bank and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the government 
set up public vocational training schools and granted subsidies of over half the cost to 
companies providing in-house vocational training. Under the government’s programme, 
those receiving vocational training from public and in-house training facilities rose from 
1,502 in 1967 to 11,840 in 1970, and from 3,890 in 15 companies in 1967 to 14,300 in 
81 companies in 1971 (Kim, 2002: 88).  
 
Social Insurance and Inequality 
 
Constitutional changes in 1972 returned Korean politics to authoritarianism after the 
Park government won two presidential elections under the democratic constitution of 
the Third Republic (Lee, 1997). From the perspective of political economy, the state’s 
developmental strategy reached a critical juncture in terms of transforming Korea’s 
class structure. Labour supply from rural areas reached its limit, and there was a build-
up of political and economic pressure from urban workers who had worked hard under 
difficult conditions (Im, 1987). 
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The Park government redirected the focus of economic development from labour-
intensive industries to capital-intensive heavy and chemical ones, while retaining an 
export-oriented strategy. Special favours were bestowed by the government on big 
chaebol that could operate the large scale of capital-intensive plants. This strategy 
inevitably generated huge transfers to the rich, making income and asset distribution 
more unequal.  
 
In this context, two major social policy programmes—the National Pension Scheme and 
National Health Insurance—were introduced in the 1970s, favouring workers in large-
scale enterprises. The former was initially considered effective for raising domestic 
capital that could be used to construct heavy and chemical industries. But the 
programme was postponed due to high inflation induced, at that time, by a sudden rise 
in oil prices.  
 
National Health Insurance was introduced in 1977, originally in firms with more than 
500 workers. The programme was gradually extended to smaller-scale companies in the 
1980s and provided health care coverage for most industrial sector employees, while 
farmers, informal sector workers, the self-employed and unemployed were excluded. In 
1978, a separate health fund under National Health Insurance was instituted to cover 
civil servants and school teachers. National Health Insurance was seen by ordinary 
citizens and policy experts as a symbol of social inequality in which those with stable 
jobs in large-scale enterprises and the public sector were protected, while the vulnerable 
were not. A strict, means-tested public assistance programme, together with Industrial 
Accident Insurance and National Health Insurance (with selective coverage), formed the 
basis of the developmental welfare state (Kwon, 2005). However, income distribution 
deteriorated under capital-intensive industrialisation and the developmental welfare 
state, as shown in table 6. 
 
Table 6. Trends in the Gini index  
 1965 1970 1976 1982 1988 1990 1993 
Gini 0.344 0.332 0.391 0.357 0.337 0.323 0.310 
Decile ratio 0.463 0.472 0.372 0.437 0.466 0.507 0.520 
Decile ratio: the ratio of income of the poorest 40 per cent to the richest 20 per cent. Source: National 
Statistical Office, social indicators (various years). 
 
The government also mobilized companies for human resource development. Owing to 
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the shift to heavy and chemical industries, it was necessary to build up labour with the 
requisite skills. Again, companies were initially lukewarm about training workers in 
these skills as we may anticipate such behaviour from the perspective of a collective 
action problem. The government introduced a Basic Law on Vocational Training, 
specifying that companies not providing this would be fined and the income used for 
public vocational training schemes. Faced with sanctions, companies reconsidered their 
manpower policy and, rather than pay fines, chose to provide in-house training. This 
was more efficient and cost-effective than contributing to public vocational training. 
Under this new institutional logic, in-house training increased dramatically until 1982, 
when heavy and chemical industries were affected by overcapacity due to a global 
recession (Yi and Lee, 2005: 150-151). The Basic Law imposed a new set of 
preferences on companies, with the latter changing their institutional logic to conform to 
economic growth and human resource development. 
 
Stabilisation and democratisation 
 
The policy regime that sought to promote heavy and chemical industries, while using 
social policy as an instrument, faltered in the late 1970s. The sudden rise in oil prices hit 
Korea twice. The country was entirely dependent on imported oil for its industries 
which, in turn, placed great pressure on the price of Korean products. Within the 
government—particularly in the Economic Planning Board, sidelined by economists of 
the Blue House (presidential office) during the heavy and chemical industries 
development plan—there was strong concern about the structure of the economy under 
the developmental regime (Haggard, 1994). A gradual credit squeeze, one of the 
government’s policy responses to the economic situation, was particularly hard on small 
and medium export-oriented companies. 
 
Regarding industrial relations, the reservoir of cheap labour dwindled, and workers 
began to organize trade unions, demanding higher wages and better working conditions. 
Industrial disputes—treated as a matter of national security—led to political turmoil. 
Harsh control, when it works, can quieten trade unions, but when it fails, the issues 
change easily from labour to politics. This is what happened in April 1979, before the 
implementation of the structural adjustment programme. The country plunged into 
political chaos, starting with a stand-off at opposition party headquarters by the Y.H. 
Trading Company’s textile workers, calling on the party to help resolve labour disputes. 
In the National Assembly, opposition parties gained strength after the 1979 general 
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election. 
 
This escalating economic pressure exploded after President Park’s assassination in 1979. 
Political turmoil ended in another military government, led by Chun Doo-hwan, which 
pursued vigorous structural adjustment aimed at stabilisation and used a heavy-handed 
approach towards trade unions (Haggard and Moon, 1990). Monetary and fiscal control 
became strict, which led to deflation in 1979-1981. President Chun’s economic policy 
appeared successful, helped by favourable international economic conditions, such as 
the high value of the Japanese yen and low oil prices, giving Korean products a 
competitive edge in international markets. 
 
Despite this fair economic performance, the Chun government was unable to avoid 
democratic movements. Throughout the 1980s, political confrontation continued 
between the authoritarian government and opposition movements for democratisation. 
Eventually, the constitution was amended to allow for the democratic election of the 
president. Social policy programmes, such as National Health Insurance and the 
National Pension Scheme, became politically contentious issues during this period 
and—in order for political parties to win support—were extended to a wider population.  
 
From the outset, the Chun government pledged to establish a welfare state during its 
tenure. The first policy introduced in this context sought to strengthen public assistance. 
As shown in table 1, the number of beneficiaries of this programme increased because 
the new official poverty line was placed higher than the previous one. Nevertheless, 
welfare rhetoric was only brief, since the Chun government pursued its stabilisation 
policy. Along with political confrontation between the government and opposition 
movements regarding democratisation, the social grievances of those excluded from 
National Health Insurance emerged as a controversial political issue, with civil society 
groups urging the government for universal coverage (Kim, 1992). In a run-up to the 
first competitive presidential election in over 15 years, the governing party’s 
candidate—Chun’s handpicked successor—promised to make National Health 
Insurance universal. This showed that social policy decisions were no longer confined 
to a handful of top policy makers in government but were part of the political agenda of 
democratic movements. 
 
The National Pension Scheme conceived by the Chun government was the swansong of 
authoritarianism, promised by every major candidate in the 1987 election campaign and 
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implemented by a more democratic leadership, making parliament the effective 
decision-making body in 1988 (Kwon, 1999: 21). Under the National Pension Scheme, 
implemented that year, all companies with over 10 employees were initially covered. 
From 1992, coverage was expanded to include companies with over five employees. 
Funding methods were similar to that of National Health Insurance, with funds 
contributed by employers and employees. From 1993, when there was concern about a 
deficit in pensions from 2030 onwards, the government attempted to increase 
contribution rates. Companies protested against this financial burden, and the 
government compromised by allowing them to pay 33 per cent of contributions (or 3 % 
of the standardized average wage) from funds reserved for retirement allowances that 
employers set aside in accordance with labour law. This system—converting reserved 
funds to contributions—lasted until 1999 (Yi, 2007: 181-2). From April 1999, the total 
contribution to the pension fund comprised contributions from employers and 
employees worth 4.5 per cent of the standardized average wage.  
   
Concluding Remarks: Korean Development Experience and Policy Implications 
 
This paper has highlighted Korea’s experience during its rapid economic growth from 
the 1960s onwards, in which government exercized strong leadership over economic 
development and successfully reduced poverty. The authors argue that, during this 
period, the initial success of economic development was firmly at the structural level 
and related to social mobility created by land reform and subsequent human resource 
development. Although the government introduced a minimum range of social policy 
programmes, it was able to reduce poverty effectively in this and succeeding phases by 
mobilising and coordinating various economic institutions and policies to carry out 
social policy functions for poverty reduction and social protection. Further, this was not 
the result of a simple trickle-down effect or separate poverty reduction measures, since 
economic and rural development policies were integrated to perform tasks of social 
protection and poverty reduction. Within the context of economic growth and poverty 
reduction, the government steered, modified institutional tasks and invented 
development missions of various institutions. It also created developmental goals 
through suitable incentives and sanctions, and the symbolic system.  
 
With this capacity, the government was able to set priorities for almost any institution, 
with economic growth leading the value hierarchy of institutions in each field. Under 
this arrangement, the government could easily coordinate policies across sectors and 
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institutions, such as—among other things—public health facilities, formal education 
institutes, rice purchasing schemes, and insurances for industrial accidents and national 
health. In other words, the developmental state in Korea successfully managed to 
establish a new set of choices for existing institutions to mobilize for development.  
 
Reflecting on the last six decades of developmental state strategy in Korea, it would be 
fair to say that its performance has been outstanding in comparison with other countries 
with development experience after the Second World War. Indicators, such as the Gini 
index, show that Korea had a relatively low level of inequality in the 1960s and early 
1970s when developmental characteristics were most apparent. Although subsequent 
phases reveal an increase in income inequality, it seems acceptable from a comparative 
point of view. However, Korea’s development strategy in the phase leading to the late 
1980s excluded social sectors—such as trade unions, farmers and the urban poor—in 
decision making under the authoritarian regime. The historical specificity of the Korean 
case does not invalidate the usefulness of its policy implications for governance for 
economic development and poverty reduction in the context of democracy. Rather, one 
needs to look further into how democracy and economic development can join forces. 
 
Since the social policy reform after the 1997-1998 economic crisis, Korea witnessed an 
expansion of the welfare state. Citizenship rights to welfare have slowly but steadily 
been established. But all is not promising. While the welfare state has become more 
inclusive, there is growing concern over its financial sustainability. It is necessary to 
rescale its level of benefits and financial responsibility, particularly its two mature 
programmes for pension and health insurance. Spending on recently introduced 
programmes, such as the Minimum Living Standard Guarantee and Employment 
Insurance, has increased rapidly. How will Korean society set priorities among these 
programmes to make the welfare state financially sustainable? 
 
In a wider context, Korea’s experience can be useful for developing countries in 
considering their own economic development and poverty reduction strategies. A 
capable bureaucracy is a sine qua non for such a task. Governments of developing 
countries should manage their institutions to perform multiple functions and be well-
coordinated within institutional and resource constraints. Society should also be open to 
all sections of the population to participate in—and contribute to—economic 
development, which has had the most important impact on poverty reduction in Korea 
so far. 
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